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Writing social science is a practice of writing about other people - whether 
they are real, or imagined . . . or even a little of both. This is an act of 
inscription where the person who writes imagines a self that is capable and 
author~ative of representing others. Writing, in this sense, is not a matter of 
the trained skills of constructing sentences, paragraphs and so forth - it is 
about the institutional location of the authors and the privileges that they seek 
to exercise. In the social sciences this posits some people as the tellers and 
others as the told. Here, the tellers seek (and sometimes find) the power to 
define the character of other people. When this is achieved, the tellings come 
to be regarded as knowledge ... truth even. In this chapter we are concerned 
with the ethical status of such knowledge as it relates to the way that people 
who study management write about people from cultures other than their 
own. In such a post~colonial context the writing of international management 
has, as we shall see, participated in reproducing culturally distributed power 
inequalities as a means to enable the management and control of western 
business interests. Our aim in this chapter is to engage with some 
philosophical ideas so as to consider the ethics of 'writing the Other' in 
relation to such forms of knowledge. 
The relationship between the writer and the written-about in international 
management is one where institutional author-ity is located in the Western 
academy and where the written-about are located as 'Other', usually outside 
the developed West. As the authors of this chapter, 'we' (Bob and Carl) are 
implicated in such relationships. We appear here before you in this book 
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Letting Knowledge Go 69 
us, sustains us and at times intoxicates and consumes us. We cannot escape 
tile tradition of privilege that enables us to write - this is the case no matter 
how much concern, unease (or even guilt) that we express for it. Given what 
we take to be our self-knowledge as authors, in writing this chapter we want 
to move towards some understanding of what it might mean to be responsible 
for 'writing the Other'. As a device to enable this, we (Bob and Carl) have 
decided to write the chapter as a first person narrative. The 'I' of the text 
below is a fictional 'I' whom we have created in order to tell one possible 
story of how to consider the relationship between Self and Other in the study 
of international management. We have separated the identity of the narrator 
from that of the authors to highlight the fact that our knowledge is one that is 
actively narrated by us - and for which we are responsible. In summary, 
please be on notice that what we write here is a work of fiction ... and that is 
why we take it so seriously. 
/look across your desk. across ils fastidious neatness of compulsively composed 
piles of files and papers. I look at your face. It is the face of a stranger. It is the 
face of a middle-aged Chinese business man - or at least these are the words I 
conjure up most inadequately to describe your face. I cannot prevent the word 
'inscrutable' from entering my mind. Why? I don't know you. I am projecting 
things onto your face from my reservoir of thoughts, ideas and images that some 
might call 'knowledge'. Included are elements from the repertoire that some label 
'Theory'. But these are jumbled with other elements differently labeled and 
unlabelable. I am asking you questions in a style that some might call 'interview' 
and I write down what you say. You tell me things that appear to be about how you 
do business ... 
[sometime later] .. 
I look across my desk at my computer screen. On il is displayed a transcript of the 
interview I had with the 'Chinese business man'. His face is no longer there - not 
even in my memory. I just have 'his' words. Whllt do they mean? I look at the 
words on the screen. My reservoir of thoughts, ideas and 'theories' direct my 
attention to certain words and certain phrases. I extract these. Later I will order 
them in a particular manner. Then I will write a text of my own because I am 
supposed to account for this 'Chinese business man'. I will presume to represent 
him and his words in my text. What can I say about him? What do I know about 
him and his world- this stranger? Are we connected? Yes/No. I am uneasy and 
uncertain. How wide and how deep is the abyss that separates me from this other 
person? 
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I go in search of knowledge, of authority. I go in search of textual 
reassurance to relieve my anxiety. How do people, labelled • international 
management scholars', account for people from different places and cultures? 
How do they make their representations? In the 1959 book Management and 
the Industrial World (Harbison and Myers, 1959), I locate the following 
passage discussing management and industrialization in Israel: 
The Arab and Sephardic elements are technically and culturally Jess well 
advanced, in fact some authorities feel that the European and Asiatic groups are 
centuries apart culturally ... For the analysis in this essay, this implies that the two 
former groups, with some few exceptions, constitute the unskilled and semiskilled 
labor force and currently, from a standpoint of potential management base, are of 
less significance (p. 188). 
I find this unsettling. Arabic people are mentioned only on this one occasion, 
Palestinians not at all. In talking about Egypt, they declare indigenous 
management 'primitive' and enterprises managed by a 'strong willed 
individual or family clique' where 'one finds a personal rather than a 
functional type of organization, a complete absence of rational management 
procedures, and a dearth of competent professional and supervisory 
personnel" (p. !58). They further assert that Egypt's greatest current asset is 
those people with overseas training or experience - since this makes them 
'sophisticated' (p. 162). Elsewhere, there is reference to British 'aristocratic 
values', German 'authoritarianism', the 'unquestioning loyalty' of the 
Japanese subordinate, the 'patrimonial', 'thrusting and unscrupulous' Indian 
businessman (p. 153). I could go on. 
This is not an obscure book- it is a foundational text for international and 
cross cultural management studies (lCMS). Harbison, Myers and others were 
there (see also Kerr et al., 1960) at the start when ICMS emerged as an 
academic discourse in the United States just after World War Two. As US 
international trade burgeoned, there was a perceived need to confront Soviet 
global incursions through the bulwark of US international investment and 
business practice. It was also desirable to have representations of other 
cultures' business and management practices so that the world could be 
managed through a knowledge that embraced the injunctions of normal 
science, realist ontology, neo-positivist epistemology and the methodological 
colours of structural functionalism, as exemplified by Parsons in sociology 
and Radcliffe-Brown in anthropology. 
What I also found in this early discourse of ICMS was a universalistic 
tendency deploying the rhetoric of modernization, development and 
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foreign policy ambitions. There is an accompanying belief that to modernize 
and develop, other countries must traverse the same kind of industrialization 
process the West had already successfully negotiated. It used a language that 
represented non-industrialized countries in relation to the pre-modern, 
undeveloped and underdeveloped world and the need for Western 
intervention to bring development and modernity to it. It is a continuation of 
an exploitative imperial project in that it involves a colonization of 
indigenous people through a 'truth' that sustains the colonizing culture (see 
Diprose, 2002)- the culture that sustains both my life and my anxieties. 
Like a bastard social Darwinism, ICMS demanded nothing Jess than 
progress- progress built behind a veneer of positivistic theories and methods 
deployed to scrutinize and represent the management and organization 
practices of the non-West. It was an appropriation strategy that constructed 
representations of non-Westerners refracted through a Western theoretic-
ideological lens and devoid of any input from them: of their understandings, 
interests and knowledge systems. With the rise to dominance of contingency 
theory in organization studies with its 'culture-free' hypothesis (Hickson et 
al., 1974), weaponry kept being added to the armoury. 
Fearing that I was misled by these dusty and sacred texts from the dawn of 
the discipline, I looked for something more contemporary. After all, most of 
this was written in the 1950s and, culturally enamoured by the notion of 
temporal progress, I hoped for more. I looked into Redding's The Spirit of 
Chinese Capitalism (1990) and found an intriguing account of contemporary 
business and management among the overseas Chinese based upon a 
carefully constructed Confucian heritage. However, not only are a divergent 
and dispersed set of people collected up and homogenized, but their 
contemporaneousness is denied by anchoring all they do to the glories of 
China's past. Essentialisms flow like the Yellow River: 'compliance and 
conservatism are widespread characteristics to a degree where they might be 
taken as central parts of the ideal-type Chinese personality' (Redding, 1990, 
p. 52); 'Chinese workers are notable for their ''trainability". They have 
traditions of diligence and disciplined education, and also a high level of 
manual dexterity' (p. 222); 'Chinese people "see the world" differently to 
others' (p. 72); 'cause for the Chinese is a matter of "connectedness", of 
understanding the mutual, reciprocal interplays between a large array of 
forces' (p. 76), and so on. 
Despite my concerns, I know that Redding's is a sympathetic attempt to 
portray another culture's business systems emically. But still, the core theme 
is that the contemporary East is only made meaningful either by reference to 
the legacies of a faded civilization, or to the West's modernity and 
progression. This is a text written by a Westerner for a Western audience, yet 
one that presumes to have gazed upon, apprehended and accurately 
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represented the East. But I don't want to single out Redding- such practices 
are apparent in almost every ICMS text. The one that really grabbed me, even 
astonished me, was Comparative Management: A Transcultural Odyssey 
(Gatley et al., 1996). Replete with its Homeric eponym, the book divides the 
world's cultures into four 'paradigm views', making a central contrast 
between Western 'atomism' and Eastern 'holism'. This is oddly linked to 
theories of the dual hemisphericity of the brain: 'These two orientations 
[atomism and holism] have been attributed to the relative dominance of the 
two brain hemispheres, the analysing reductive left brain, which seems to 
dominate the Western world and the synthesising, visio-spatial right brain 
which seems to dominate in the East' (p. 13). My hopes for proper 
knowledge of other cultures began to wane. 
If I did come to a point of knowing something, it was that ICMS, like all 
research practices, is embroiled in the problematics and politics of 
representation. But there seemed a particular acuity in ICMS given its 
express encounter with difference and the presence of differential power 
structures and relationships inevitably framing any research. ICMS offered 
itself to me as a practice of appropriation and representation where Western 
scholars (my own image keeps creeping back, despite my protestations) 
subject other countries' /cultures' management and organizational practices to 
the machinery of northern science so they can construct representations that 
stand as 'knowledge' all the better to engage with, manage and control them. 
Simultaneously, the West's management systems and managers are conjured 
up and valorized in relation to the represented Other. This is a white man's 
knowledge spoken with an authority and universalism of egological 
narcissism. It requires no conspiracy theory to see this authority as 
handmaiden to Western dominance in international business. 
It was clear by now that the answers and solutions I was looking for were 
not located in ICMS. In fact, ICMS made my problems worse. I did find, 
though, that my problems resonated with the philosophical investigations of 
postcolonial theory. I turned to it for guidance. Initially I considered the 
detailed examination of the representation of the colonial Other by the West 
in Said's discussion of Orienta/ism (1978). For Said 'oriental ism is a style of 
thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"' (p. 5). 
Orientalism understands difference in relation to the primacy of a western 
Self. Indeed, this notion of the Other, for Said, is a means through which the 
Oriental is positioned as not only being different from the West but also as 
inferior. The Orient is used to reinforce a sense of Western supremacy, such 
that the Orient is only ever an image of what is non-Western, and therefore 
lesser. Orientalism constructs, appropriates and represents the Oriental Other 
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attempt to see, understand and explain any actual other people and 
providing a representation meaningful to the West. Through 
the Other is understood in the language of the Same (i.e. the 
it is an assimilation of the Other to the Self. Said meticulously 
the multitude of representations and representational practices and 
their interdependence with the institutions and practices of 
(n:;:~:=~~T~h,1ii;s~was a 'knowledge' of the orient that came to be regarded ii stable' (p. 32). But the Oriental never spoke for him-or 
~::/j::n! what I read in ICMS to Said, I provisionally concluded that 
ic and northern science were twins enabling and legitimating 
!COUrs,es that continue to serve the neo-colonial, imperialist project of 
ICMS is a component. These representations are not accurate or real, 
were never required to be; as Said says, Orientalism is 'entirely distinct 
unattached to the east as understood within and by the east' (p. vii). 
is no genuine desire to know other people or cultures in their own 
ipe<:ifici~y. I was not the first to realize these connections - they have 
gecerttly been documented in the margins of organization and management 
(see Westwood, 2001; Prasad, 2003). In ICMS, as in Orientalism, the 
is that which is constructed by a Western discourse that claims to speak 
•authoritatively and definitively. Along the way, non-Western people are 
silenced through not being able to self-represent. Silenced through being 
homogenized. Silenced through having their knowledge systems derided, 
obliterated, ignored or marginalized. Silenced through the West's control and 
policing of the discourse and the machineries of knowledge production and 
dissemination. 
Said was pessimistic. He thought Westerners were incapable onto logically 
of a 'true' or even sympathetic representation of others. This made me 
shudder. 
So what is my relationship to my Chinese businessman and how can I 
relate to his difference from me? How do I deal with cross-cultural research 
when my knowledge and culture are rooted in the West? What might my 
(subject) position be? Who is my Western Self that is in relation to that which 
I find different? What are. my responsibilities? Should I presume to speak 
about/of/for this person, or remain silent? If I speak, by what right do I do so? 
My questions remain unanswered, reinforced by the belief that all our 
confrontations with difference are fraught with danger. 
Whilst Said focuses almost entirely on the discourse(s) of the colonizer, 
reading Bhabha (I 994) took me in a different direction: towards a different 
idea of the Other. Bhabha imagines a complex and negotiated interplay 
between the colonized and the colonizer. He does not accept that colonial 
discourse is monolithic or that the colonized is merely captive of that 
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discourse. This seems more respectful and less pessimistic - I like it. The 
West, he argues, has an ever-present ambivalence towards the Oriental Other 
informed in part by its own psychic uncertainties and anxieties. The Orient is 
for example, at once both completely knowable through the 'scientific' gaz~ 
of the colonizer, but at the same time it is an object of desire, a danger and 
threat that is mysterious and unknowable. The relationship is essentially 
unstable, mobile and contlictual; structured 'by forms of multiple and 
contradictory belief (Bhabha, 1994, p. 75). Bhabha's Other cannot be 
apprehended as having a set of fixed, pre-given characteristics inscribing a 
predetermined cultural identity. Nor can all colonizers be seen as coming to 
the Other with a fixed and homogenous set of ideas and categories with 
which to affix to the Other in a monological imposition. 
For Bhabha cultural identities are negotiated, and cultural differences and 
their representations are 'performed' in a liminal space, a space ofhybridity, 
since neither Self nor Other sustains an independent and untrammelled 
identity at the interface. Bhabha sees the homogenization and monolithic 
tendencies of colonial and Orientalist discourse as akin to fetishism - an 
attempt to construct a fixed, arrested and stable imaginary Other to satiszy the 
desires of Self. It is a fetishism constituted by the oscillation, the 'play', 
between the desire for affirmation of the Same or sameness and the anxiety 
associated with difference and a sense of lack in self in the face of that 
difference, that Otherness. However, the meanings slip and disperse and the 
would-be monolithic discourse loses coherence. It fractures to reveal the 
uncertainties, ambiguities and fetishes of the colonizer. Colonial discourse is 
always 'less than one and double' (Bhabha, 1994, p. 97). The discourse is 
unstable because of the 'translation' as the West's ideas and theories get 
ensnared in the dynamics of interface, of the space between Self and Other, 
and become hybridized. Even if the Other is seduced into a self-identification 
with the identity offered by the colonizer, this mimicry turns back to the 
colonizer as a deformation, challenging the coherence and fixity the colonizer 
aspires to. The mimic's not-quite-sameness destabilizes the regime of the 
stereotype and the coherence of the identity of the Self seeking definition in a 
fixed and knowable Other. 
In terms of my own problems as a Western ICMS researcher, reading 
Bhabha shows that I cannot assume a stable identity in the Other that I could 
find, know and then write. It also tells me that my own identity is at stake. 
The other person that I confront is already soaked in the (neo)colonial 
experience, in the serried representations proffered by the (my) West, and in 
his/her reactions and hybridizations of those strategies. More complexly, any 
sense of this other person available to me can only emerge in the performance 
of the interaction, in the interstices of a cultural encounter, the constitution of 
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cannot see any way back from these recognitions to the old assurances of 
or even limpid humanistic pluralizations. But then I 
that I am a hybrid too, a mongrel diasporized 'Englishman', a 
IStn,cte:d identity at the interstices of all manner of historical and cultural 
dl11ences and confusions. Furthermore, is not the ethos of the United 
based upon hybridity and does not the field ofiCMS actually celebrate 
as a feature of globalization - itself presaging a dissolution of those 
cross-cultural differences that beset international business encounters? 
construction of the mimic man was, after all, a colonial device of control. 
·we are all hybrids, where is the difference that differentiates and where is 
divide that we have to negotiate? 
If compelled to reject any essentialist view of identity and the epistemic 
by which colonial discourse constructs universalist categories, 
sttlre•otypes and codings of difference, am I left with complete heterogeneity 
particularism? Am I doomed to only speak about this particular 
'Chinese' 'businessman' (even those categorizations may be troublesome 
essentialisms). 
Looking further, I approach the work of Spivak and find her using the 
term toute autre to ward off assimilation and sustain heterogeneity. The 
Other, in Spivak, remains an absolute alterity, akin to Bhabha's notions of the 
completely Other, the 'untranslatable' element of identity (Bhabha, 1994, p. 
74), and the incommensurability of cultural differences. This absolute Other 
cannot be assimilated to the sameness of Self, cannot be recuperated in the 
codes and categories of the West. Spivak seems to advise that the absolute 
Other be considered as an 'inaccessible blankness' revealing the limits of the 
West's knowledge and representational systems. 
But, where does all that leave me? What can I say about the differences I 
encounter - am I silenced, unable to represent at all? But, pragmatically, 
difference is spoken, whether that results in appropriation, misrepresentation 
or other violations. But can I make representations of those seen as Other 
responsibly and ethically, given that if I speak I cannot step outside my own 
particular, historical, cultural, ideological subject-position. I cannot step 
outside the interestedness of my need to so represent, I cannot assume 
innocence. 
In the 'Politics of Translation', Spivak (1993) acknowledges my concerns 
stating that 'it is not possible for us as ethical agents to imagine otherness or 
alterity maximally. We have to turn the Other into something like the self in 
order to be ethical.' She invokes Derrida's notion of the inner voice of the 
Other in us. As Spivak notes 'Derrida does not invoke "letting the other(s) 
speak for himself' but rather invokes an "appeal" to or "call" to the "quite-
other" (toute autre as opposed to a self-consolidating other), of "rendering 
delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us"' (Spivak, 
, 
•. 
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1988, p. 89). This 'Self-in-the-Other' echoes Bhabha's insistence (via 
that a sense of self and identity is dependent on the Other. In 'Re1memb•erinj 
Fanon', he says that 'to exist is to be called into being in relation to 
Otherness' (Bhabha, 1986), Self-Other as ineluctably relational and 
notion of a totally independent Self is as untenable as an absolute Other. 
Spivak retreats from the abyss of complete heterogeneity 
acknowledging it to be an idealization. The construction of collective 
identities is allowable as a pragmatic strategic essentialism necessary to 
achieve full decolonization. Essentialisms are permissible provided we 
remain conscious of their expedient, strategic status and do not imagine a 
real, accurate representation has been created, and provided it contributes to a 
liberatory, not repressive, practice. So, I am not condemned to silence or 
solipsism with respect to difference, I can speak, but l need to do so brutally 
aware of my own commitments, motives and subject positions, of my 
responsibilities, and of the brutality of language. 
I am still groping towards an ethic of my relationships to those different 
others I encounter in my research practice and am not fully persuaded that 
Said, Bhabha and Spivak have given me the answer. Given the intellectual 
connections and lineage between Spivak and Bhabha to Derrida, l was drawn 
back to Emmanuel Levinas. It is hoped that some inspiration might be found 
there. Upon reading Levinas I was encouraged when I found that he not only 
dealt specifically with an ethics of the Self-Other relationship, but also 
directly addressed this in terms of work. 
Levinas expressed both grave concerns and hope about the way others are 
understood in relation to work. Here, other people are 'already merchandise 
reflected in money' - a mode of representation which renders people as 
substitutable such that there is an attempt to rob them of any true difference-
any true particularity. Despite such force the absolute difference of the other 
person does not submit entirely. This is the 'the en-ergy of the vigilant 
presence which does not quit the expression' even when the will withdraws 
from work. The defect that Levinas identifies is 'the unrecognition of the 
worker that results from this essential anonymity . . . a humanity of 
interchangeable men, of reciprocal relation' (Levinas, 1978/1991, pp. 297-
298). 
Levinas' expression of the humanity of interchangeable persons speaks 
directly to my experience with ICMS - in fact it could be said that lCMS 
exacerbates this interchangeability in a context where these persons are from 
elsewhere. Whether in relation to work or culture, the worker is already 
positioned both as 'merchandise reflected in money' and as having his/her 
particularity rendered into cultural anonymity. As Levinas argues, there is a 
gaping abyss between work, as production for the consumption of others, and 
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IJational management practices where it is the east that produces and the 
consumes. Indeed, for Levinas work is a matter of 'actions, 
manners, objects utilized and fabricated' (Levinas, 1978/1991, p. 
a relationship of exteriority in the sense that workers are always 
I'Ch:ang:eat•le so as to render them subjects of the 'anonymous field of 
life' which 'reduces to the same what at first presented itself as 
(p. 176). Such a reduction to the same echoes Bhabha's concerns, but 
the possibility of another Other - one whose absolute difference 
the Same is not irredeemable. This is an Other whose 'will' might not 
tN•iola;ted by regarding him/her only in terms of belonging to categories 
anonymize particularity. When Levinas writes of 'political life', 
~e•rstc)()d as rules and institutions for the governance of people, humanity is 
more than the interchangeability of people. Such work is a betrayal of 
self- a masking and dissimulation of the self(see pp. 176-178) involving 
' 'primal disrespect' that enables the exploitation and Orientalization of the 
that I noted in ICMS. 
At this point, my problems seem to be getting worse. Is there no hope for a 
to the ethical problems of representing the Other in ICMS or 
!'!Organization studies? Levinas does, however, provide a proviso, one that 
•might help me out. He is specific in claiming that the political renders people 
anonymous only if it goes unrebuked. It is within this fissure in the politics of 
work where such a rebuke, such a critique, is rendered possible. But I am 
starting to realize that the real difficulty is the way that my problem is 
articulated as being one of a search for knowledge. Levinas' attestation to a 
rebuke is not based on the desire for knowledge of an object (e.g. the 
objectified worker) but a form of knowing that is 'able to put itself in 
question'. It is the Western desire to have secure knowledge of the Other that 
engenders ICMS' post-colonial predicament. My starting question needs to 
be questioned, not answered. Answering would mean 'elaborating a 
psychology' which involves 'the determination of the other by the same'. 
Questioning would mean 'the act of unsettling its own condition'. This is an 
attestation to the Other that 'eludes thematization' while being shameful of 
'the consciousness of [its] own injustice' in refuting the identity of the Other 
by representing it (Levinas, 1978/199I, p. 86). 
But I have elided the crucial question that haunts all statements so far and 
that informed the anxiety of the anecdotes I opened with. This is the question 
of the ethics of the representational practices of ICMS. The ethics of how 
people denoted as different are constructed in Western systems of knowledge 
- of how other people are rendered as Other. It is here that a conception of 
the Other reaches its full potential in Levinas. 
For Levinas, ethics requires the Other be considered as radically different 
from the same- it needs to account for the absolute particularity, strangeness 
·:-,,;-, 
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and unknowability of the Other. As Levinas describes it, this is an Other 
irreducible to the I, irreducible to me - an Other radically separated from 
oneself and one's knowledge rather than a subject of it. Levinas makes the 
telling point that comprehension, intelligence and knowledge are a 'way of 
approaching the known being such that its alterity with regard to the knowing 
being vanishes' (Levinas, 1969/1991, p. 42). I take this to mean that 
recognition of the Other places it outside such knowledge systems and into 
the realm of ethics. So, must I address the Other from a point that might be 
located outside of knowledge itself? 
I started with a problem of how to understand difference without falling 
into the trap of that difference being rendered as an Orientalist Other. Now 
my problem seems to be less about the specific knowledge of ICMS, than 
about knowledge itself, about the presumption of the knowabil ity of 
difference and the presumption of a righteousness of the quest for such 
knowledge. What Levinas adds is that rather than being premised on a pre-
occupation with knowledge, subjectivity starts with ethics in the sense that 
the self is 'hostage' of the Other not a knower of it- this is the very Other in 
relation to which the self exists. This relationality suggests that a self is 
always one from which a response to the Other is demanded and to which the 
self is responsible. This is not a relationship whereby difference is subsumed 
into or known by the self (as in ICMS), but rather one of 'infinite 
responsibility' to the Other - an Other who can never be known in the 
intensity of its own particularity and to whom one is responsible without the 
expectation of reciprocity. As Davis, commenting on Levinas, says 'the Other 
lies absolutely beyond my comprehension and should be preserved in all its 
irreducible strangeness' (Davis, 1996, p. 3). It is with such a Levinasian 
concept of the Other that ICMS' treatment of difference can be fully 
appreciated as being unethical. 
But dealing with such an absolute and infinite conception of the Other is 
not about knowing nothing, but about being prepared to revoke the primacy 
of knowledge of the Other in the name of ethics. It is not an ethics that can be 
applied to solve my ethical crisis of representation. More radically, the 
relationship between Self and Other is ethics. This is a relationship of 
exteriority entailing being open to 'the existence of the separated being' 
(Levinas, 1969/1991, p. 302). Responsibility, or ethics, is not something 
achieved by a particular way of dealing with other people but is rather a 
condition of the self that can never be achieved. The anxiety that provoked 
my questions must remain unresolved if this ethics is to remain alive. If I 
thought I had solved my initial problems of wanting to know how to capture 
difference, then those problems would have been multiplied. My question 
does not provoke a knowledge-based solution, it provokes affect and 
sensibility: 'Knm 
or by the hold, or 
Naivete is al\\ 
assuage guilt and 
doer of knowled! 
and I do so both ' 
These representat 
the unknowabilil} 
and ethics, yet If 
begins its irrita 
representations of 
is no simple maJ 
represent other pe 
puts the 'represe 
describes this un 
heterogeneous, fo 
obliged - it is ol 
impossible decisi< 
there is no free 
undecidability'; an 
that cannot be locc 
is not overcome b) 
f!Jhe undecidable 
ghost - in every 
from within any< 
that would assurf 
decision (Derrida. 
The ethical issue fc 
for the representati 
Others and accepti 
decision rather tha 
clearly relevant to 
salient to ICMS on 
much of its represe 
colonial ICMS tha 
problem of represe 
present when chom 
and in making parti 
points out, are al 
a 'way of 
e knowing 
mean that 
s and into 





I for such 
on a pre-
sense that 
y Other in 




wn in the 
vithout the 
'the Other 
d in all its 
Levinasian 
1 be fully 
1e Other is 
1e primacy 





is rather a 
t provoked 




Letting Knowledge Go 79 
a.nsibility: 'Knowledge would be the suppression of the other by the grasp, 
llr;by the hold, or by the vision that grasps before the grasp' (ibid.). 
ro•· Naivett! is always inviting - an invitation to take up easy positions that 
iiiSuage guilt and uncertainty, that remove anxiety. I am not immune. I am a 
(doer of knowledge. I do represent other people who are different from me, 
,illd I do so both as professional researcher and as everyday user of language. 
lfbese representations are 'knowledge', the very knowledge that tries to cast 
:the unknowability of the Other asunder. So given the antipathy of knowledge 
and ethics, yet the impossibility of not doing knowledge, a new question 
begins its irritation: 'how might ICMS take responsibility for its 
representations of the Other?' Let's not be glib- this 'taking responsibility' 
is no simple matter, it is one we face everyday as we choose how we 
represent other people by writing and talking. In Derrida's (1992) terms this 
puts the 'representor' squarely in a position of undecidability. Derrida 
describes this undecidability as 'the experience of that which, though 
heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still 
obliged - it is obligation that we must speak - to give itself up to the 
impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules'. For Derrida, 
there is no free decision without the experience of the 'ordeal of 
undecidability'; an ordeal that is never calculable but always open to a future 
that cannot be located or predicted in the present or the past. And this ordeal 
is not overcome by deciding: 
[t]he undecidable remains caught. lodged, at least as a ghost - but an essential 
ghost - in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs 
from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed criteriology 
that would assure us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very event of a 
decision (Derrida, 1992, pp. 24-25). 
The ethical issue for ICMS that this implies is one of taking up responsibility 
for the representation of those that have hitherto been subsumed as Oriental 
Others and accepting that such representations be regarded as a matter of 
decision rather than of neutral, objective or mimetic representation. This is 
clearly relevant to any practice of representing the Other, but is particularly 
salient to ICMS on account of the colonial legacy of exploitation on which so 
much of its representational practices depend. In a sense this calls for a post-
colonial ICMS that takes its colonial legacy as being central both to the 
problem of representation and to the decisions that might be made in the 
present when choosing (or choosing not to) study people from other cultures 
and in making particular representations of them. Such decisions, as Derrida 
points out, are always particular and always require some ordeal of 
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undecidability: '[e]ach case is other, each decision is different and requires an 
absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought 
to guarantee absolutely' (Derrida, 1992, p. 23 ). In a Levinasian sense 'not 
knowing how to respond in the face of the call from the Other ... involves 
undecidability, a clear and certain recognition that one is drawn in [at least] 
two irreducible directions but still must decide in order to act' (Jones, 2003, 
p. 239). Moreover, as Derrida proposes, deciding in the face of the 
undecidable is a form of madness, rather than of knowledge or rationality. It 
is an immersion in this madness that might bend towards the impossible 
demands of an ethics of the infinitely Other. 
From Levinas to Derrida, a new ethics of ICMS seems imaginable (but not 
easy). This imaginability emerges when the representation of the Other in 
ICMS is regarded as a site of undecidability, even though the reality ofiCMS 
has been born from a desire to remove the undecidability of the Other by 
rendering it knowable in an absolute and universalistic fashion. The 
radicalness of this aporia weighs heavy, especially since 'management 
thought has returned again and again to the suggestion that there might be a 
solid ground ... that would remove uncertainty' and that 'the disappearance 
or management of political and ethical quandaries in the face of some great 
calculating machine would indicate not ethics but rather then end of ethics' 
(Jones, 2003, pp. 238-239). The problem then is that the desire for certainty 
in knowing the Other (as many) has been at the very centre of ICMS as a 
project whose intention was to render the cultural Other knowable such that 
s/he can be managed. An ethicalization of ICMS would entail, at very least, 
abandoning this quest as both futile and wrong. 
Discussing Levinas' ethics in relation to the multitude of Other people, 
Hansel notes the political imperative that '[the] institution ... can in turn 
pervert itself, forgetting its justification and oppressing human beings in an 
impersonal totality. We must remain vigilant to prevent human rights -or, 
more precisely, the rights of the other man [sic] in his uniqueness - from 
being flouted by the abstraction of the system' (Hansel, 1999, p. 122). If we 
regard ICMS as having been a handmaiden to the modern institution of the 
western corporation, then the political implications of Hansel's comments to 
ICMS are palpable. In one sense this is relevant to all confrontations with 
difference in organizations, however, ICMS' colonial and Orientalist legacy 
makes it particularly salient to, and exaggerated in, that discourse. At very 
least, this involves Levinas' awareness that 'we' or 'them' can never be the 
plural of 'I' or 'you'. 
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t~oJ•IorliZIItion, the opening of modes of living beyond the imperialism sustained 
truth of colonization, rests on the ability of the colonizers to respond to [!he] 
ReStali<>n of their 'truth' generously, in Levinas' sense. This is a generosity born 
affective corporeal response to alterity !hat generates rather than closes off 
difference (p. 146). 
and get at such an affectivity, I turned to Levinas' distinction between 
the saying in Otherwise than Being. lfl've come to a provisional 
from these deliberations, it is about how the knowledge of the said 
be replaced by the affect of the saying as a means of cultivating a 
undecidability for an ethical ICMS. For Levinas (1978/1991), the 
is that which is signified - it is the ontological function of language that 
to represent and objectifY; it is that which would: 
iilcleal:ize the identity of entities . . . [it] . .. would constitute that identity, and 
· recuperate the irreversible, coagulate the flow of time into a 'something', 
· thematize, ascribe a meaning. It would take up a position with regard to this 
. . ;:_. ~. 'something', fixed in a present, re-present it to itself, and thus extract it from the 
labile character of time (p. 37). 
fp these terms, ICMS, in its representation of the Oriental Other, is a 
particular and extreme instance of the objectification that is enabled by the 
said- one that fails to acknowledge its limits or the potency of that failure. 
Saying, on the other hand, is that 'which signifies prior to essence, prior to 
identification' (ibid., p. 46). The saying precedes the said, such that the said 
can never be reduced to saying (despite the most ardent protestations). 
Levinas' comments point to the very limits of language as a means of 
signifYing the ethical relation with the Other. It is in the saying that language 
is not reduced to an objective knowledge but involves that activity of 
knowing difference. Saying is a matter of responding to the Other - one that 
'weaves an intrigue of responsibility' (ibid., p. 6), it is sincerity, an openness 
to the Other rather than closing off the Other in the said. Saying is not 'the 
communication of a said, which would immediately cover over and 
extinguish or absorb the said, but saying holding open its openness, without 
excuses, evasions or alibis, delivering itself without saying anything said" 
(ibid., p. 143). The saying is the ethics of language that constitutes the 
condition of the possibility of the said, yet an exclusive focus on the said 
overlooks the 'essential exposure to the Other'; the quandary that results is 
that 'Saying is never fully present in the Said, yet the Said also constitutes the 
only access we have to it; it leaves a trace on the Said but is never revealed in 
it' (Davis, 1996, pp. 75 and 76). 
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Levinas' distinction between the saying and the said does not 'solve' any 
(of my) epistemological problems, it more importantly suggests 
reconsideration of those problems, a reconsideration that I have been 
to work through here. The saying points towards an ethics requiring a 
humility in relation to the knowledge structures that I might be seduced by 
structures that are inevitably in the realm of the said. As Ronell has 
convincingly argued, the most dominant form of stupidity is not that which 
lacks knowledge, but rather than which 'doesn't allow for questions about the 
world' or for doubt, relying instead on the demand for knowledgeable 
answers. This is a stupidity that manifests in forms of knowledge (including 
ICMS) that 'demand an answer and instrumentalize the moment of the 
question, they escape the anguish of the indecision, complication, or 
hypothetical redoubling that characterizes intelligence' (Ronell, 2002, p. 43). 
Speaking against such knowledgeable and contained moments there is a call 
for responsibility that 'must always be excessive, beyond bounds, viewed 
strictly as unaccomplished' such that the ethical being 'can never be 
grounded in certitide or education or lucididy or prescriptive obeisance' 
(ibid., p. 19). 
ICMS has been a practice aimed at knowing difference- in Ronell's terms 
it is guilty of a dominant stupidity. Ethically, this stupidity has resulted in a 
practice that has failed to be open to the otherness of the Other; instead, it has 
always sought to render it in relation to the same or self. As a form of 
knowledge ICMS fails to take responsibility for the undecidabilities (and un-
knowabilities) of its own epistemic practice, and it fails to leave open those 
questions that might sustain its own ethicality in relation to the difference it 
tries to know. What this has left me with is the idea that ICMS, as a post-
colonial knowledge system used to categorize difference such that it be made 
manageable, is one that at best privileges knowledge over ethics and at worst 
destroys ethics with knowledge. 
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